

### Module 3 Operational Framework for UNFORPRO

### Module 3 Content

Lesson 3.1 Military Unit Tactical FP Planning Considerations

Lesson 3.2 Police Unit Tactical FP Planning Considerations

Lesson 3.3 Tactical Planning Considerations for IED Risk Mitigation

Lesson 3.4 Cyber Threat Mitigation

Lesson 3.5 Mitigating Misinformation / Disinformation Impacting UN Unit Operations



# Lesson 3.1 Military Unit Tactical Planning Considerations for Force Protect (FP)

### Content

- Using the Decision-Making Process for FP tactical planning considerations
- Threat based planning tools
- Threat analysis
- Risk analysis


### Learning Objectives

- Explain how the decision-making process and mission analysis tools help in the threat-based approach to planning FP
- Describe how a unit might collect information to better understand a potential attacker's intent
- Identify key components of the threat analysis
- Explain why the risk analysis process helps prioritise planning
- Use the FP planning tools during the TTX

### Key Terms and definitions for FP Planning


- Tactical area of operations (TAO) –AOR more narrowly defined for a specific unit's tactical deployment
- Potential Tactical Area of Operations potential area for future tactical deployment
- Static and moving- unit's physical state for a tactical operation
- Planning phases
  - a. Current deployment / location
  - b. Transit (movement routes)
  - c. Tactical area of operation

### Conventional decision-making process



# Mil / Police Unit Task to Support an Operation Mesons analysis Course of action Orders production Checation


Tactical decisionmaking process




### FP Planning Considerations-Uses the same DMP

Mitigation Measures to Reduce risks

for the tactical decision-making process focused on threats against your unit and the ability to accomplishing the operation






### Receipt of Mission

Mission Mandate **CONOPS** Mission Concept Strategy Mission POC Force Commander Plan **OPORD** Sector Commander **OPORD** 

### Start Looking at Missions from a FP viewpoint


- Your current location / deployment
- Do you need to transit to a new area
- Your Future tactical area of operation
- What assets does higher HQs provide
- Medical facilities / CASEVAC
- Continue to refine Analysis of the Operational Environment (AOE)



Receipt of mission

FP planning included for all unit missions





For all static and mobile operations

### Mission Analysis

- 1. (OEE) Physical, Human, Information Terrain
- 2. Actor Evaluation (AE)- Identification of Key Actors
  - a. Potential Attackers-Groups- armed / unarmed (organised & unorganised)
  - b. Communities- that pose a potential for generating attackers
  - c. Host Nation security forces-possible assistance (or attacker)
  - d. Other actors- for possible assistance and support
  - e. Your Unit-type, capabilities, mission area

#### 3. Threat Analysis (Situational Integration)

- a. Overview
- b. Key Elements Analysis of potential to attack / harm
- c. Matrix Predictive analysis of threat CoAs (5Ws)

#### 4. Risk Analysis

- a. Vulnerability assessment
- b. Capability assessment
- c. Danger level assessment
- d. Risk analysis matrix



Information Requirements established

Recce operations conducted

Information requested from and offered to intelligence cells

### Potential Attackers-Groups (Armed / Unarmed)

#### 1. Pinpoint location and area of operations

#### 2. Determine:

- Number, composition, organised / not organised
- C2 / Communications / computers
- Compliance
- Hostile historical background
- Capabilities
- Human Rights Record / use of child
- Social media access; mis/disinformation exposure: cell phones, internet access, internet cafés, etc.


#### 3. Identify leaders

## Mission analysis Course of action Orders production

Execution

### Key actors

### Potential Attackers- Groups



# Mission analysis Course of action Orders production Execution

For each
Armed /
unarmed
group within
the potential
TAO

### Key actors

### Potential Attackers-Groups

Group	Location	Number	Composition	C2 Commo
X				
Υ				
Z				
Compliance	Capabilities	Social	Historical	Human
		Media Access	Background Patterns	Rights Record

### Key actors

### Civilian Communities- that pose a potential to generate attackers

### 1. Pinpoint locations

#### Determine:

- Number of civilians (gender and age breakdown)
- Historical background for civil unrest / violence
- Compliance
- Exposure to Mis/disinformation, cell phones, internet access, internet cafés, etc.
- Access to weapons, explosives

#### 3. Identify leaders



Information Requirements are established.

Patrols and recce operations are conducted.


Information is requested from intelligence cells

# Mission analysis Course of action Orders production Execution

### Key actors

### Civilian Communities-

that pose a potential to generate attackers



### Key actors

### Civilian Communitiesthat pose a potential for generating attackers



Communities,
groups
identified
within the unit
areas of
operations
(current and
future)

Civilian Community	Location	Numbers & Gender	Compliance	Historical Background	Social Media Access	Access to weapons



### Host State Security Forces (HSSF)for potential assistance / support


- 1. Pinpoint locations and area of operations
- 2. Determine:
  - Number, composition and C2
  - Compliance
  - Capability and will to assist / support our unit
  - Human rights records child soldiers
- 3. Identify leaders

**Note:** If HSSF –groups / units are assessed as potential attackers targeting UN units- use the Potential Attackers matrix tools


# Receipt of Mission Mission analysis Course of action Orders production Execution

### Key actors

### Host State Security Forces



### Key actors



For each Host
State security
forces unit
deployed within
the unit's area of
deployment

### Host State Security Forcesfor potential assistance / support

HSSF	Location	Number	Composition	C2
HSSF X				
HSSF Y				
HSSF Z				
Political	Capabilities	Will	HR Violations	Other

**Note:** If HSSF –groups / units are assessed as potential attackers targeting UN units- use the Potential Attackers matrix tools

# Receipt of Mission Mission analysis Course of action Orders production Execution

May include UN, non-UN actors, units, int'l or UNSC mandated international forces

Existing
coordination
mechanisms will
facilitate acquisition
of relevant
information

### Key actors


### Other Support Actors

- 1. Pinpoint location and area of operations
- 2. Determine:
  - Mandate and capabilities
  - Assets / capabilities
  - Capacity and will to support or assist
  - Interoperability / communications
- 3. Identify the existing coordination mechanisms with the mission

# Receipt of Mission Mission analysis Course of action Orders production Execution

### Key actors

### Other FP Support Actors



# Mission analysis Course of action Orders production Execution

### Key actors

### Other Support Actors

Other potential FP support actors	Location	Mandate	Capabilities	Support capacity
Unit A				
Unit B				
Actor C				



### Our Unit and Mission


1. Current and future locations (static and mobile)

#### 2. Determine:


- Number, composition
- C2 / Communications
- Armored
- Mobility
- Firepower
- Intelligence / reconnaissance capabilities
- Cyber Security Capabilities
- Medical capacity / capabilities (Day , Night CASEVAC)
- Time Distances for support to unit (QRF, medical, Indirect fire)
- 3. Attached, non-organic units, assets provided

Key actors

### Our Unit and Mission



Consider all phases of an operation / mission both static and mobile




### Our Unit – Assessment / Overview

Unit / Sub- Unit	Number Composition Min unit	C2 Commo	Armored	Mobility	Firepower	Intel	Cyber Sec	Medical	Time Distances for Support

### Assets / Attachments for operation (Nonorganic)

Asset / Unit Type	Location When Duration	C2 TACON OPCON Commo	Added Capability / Type of Support	Support Required / provided by your unit to the asset / attached unit	Other



### Threat analysis Overview

- 1. Consideration threats identified
- 2. Analyse potential attackers that may impact your unit
- 3. For each threat identified develop the threat CoA-

- Attacks include direct fire, indirect fire, IEDs, Assaults, Cyber, Sabotage
- Potential attacker- armed / unarmed groups (Who)
- Type of attack –direct fire, indirect fire, IED, assault, sabotage, cyber (What)
- Your unit or subunit affected (to / against Whom)
- Location of attack (Where)
- Day / time period of attacks estimated (When)
- Motivation, intent behind attack (Why)
- Tactics, maneuver used for attack (How)

Mis/Disinformation offensives included in Cyber

### Threat analysis Key Element

Group	Your Unit's Operation viewed as Antagonistic	Retaliation	Current threats Social media	Other Factors
Group <b>X</b>	Concern	Concern		
Group <b>Y</b>	Concern		Concern	
Group <b>Z</b>				

For each group or community that may impact your unit operation

### Mission analysis Course of action Orders production Execution

### Threat analysis Matrix


Develop a predictive threat CoA for each threat identified

Note: the same group (A) can pose several different threats

THREAT	WHO	To WHOM (against)	WHAT -Type of attack	WHEN	WHERE	HOW
1	Group A	Unit x	IED	15 May XX	Vic Goya Route Blue	2-man Tm buried Cell phone initiated
2	Group A	Unit x	Direct fire	1-10 June Daytime	Town Unidad	Plan riot stop UN convoy, snipers
3	Group B	Unit x	Indirect Fire	2 May Night	TOB Atlo from crossroad	Light Motors hit and run
4	Group C	Unit b	Cyber Mis/Dis	1-30 June XXX	Social Med	false news UN harm children



Type of attacks - direct fire, indirect fire, IED, Assault, sabotage, cyber



### Risk Analysis Overview


- 1. Vulnerability assessment- our unit vulnerabilities against a given threat
- 2. Support actors' capability assessment- HSSF, UN and other mandated units that can assist; each potential support actor that may assist or support
- 3. Danger level assessment for each threat identified
- 4. Develop a risk analysis matrix as a visual tool to help identify and prioritise the threats with higher risks



### Vulnerability assessment

#### Our unit's vulnerability for each threat identified

Threat	C2 Commo	Armor	Mobility	Fire- power	Intel	Cyber	Medical	Size / Coefficient Min unit for tactical deployment	Time Distances for others to Support your unit
Threat 1									
Threat 2									



#### Risk analysis

### Support actors capability assessment

For each potential FP Support actor in the areas of current location / deployment, Transit areas, and TAO both assigned and potential.

Threat 1	Intention to protect	Distance Vs. mobility	Capability	Interoperability
FP Support Actor 1	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
FP Support Actor 2	No	Yes	Yes	No
FP Support Actor 3	?	No	Yes	No

# Mission analysis Course of action Orders production Execution


### Risk analysis

### Danger level assessment

For each Threat

Threat	Intent	Threat vs Unit Capabilities	Historical	Other (Commander concerns)
Threat 1	High	High	High	High
Threat 2	Low	High	Medium	Low
Threat 3	Medium	Low	Medium	Low

### Risk analysis Matrix






### Unit Course of Action (CoA)

- 1. Counters threat COA
- 2. Plans to reduce the likelihood
- 3. Plans to reduce the impact
- 4. Resources required requested
- 5. Coordination with FP Support actors
- 6. Higher HQs briefed / consultation / approval
- 7. In consultation with Higher HQs, a priority designation on the criticality of mission- high, medium, low priority

Development
of CoAs are
considered for
the 3 phasescurrent
deployment,
transit, and
future

### Our Unit's Force Protection COAspurpose to reduce impact or likelihood of threat

Threat	Threat 1	Threat 2	Threat 3
Who	Who in our unit executes the tasks		
What	the military tasks		
When	Time/ timing		
Where	Location		
How	Concept of maneuver		
Why	Purpose End State		
External Coordination	HSSF / other Support units		



### Order Production

- 1. Approval of plans
- 2. FRAGO sent

Plans must be approved by the higher HQs

- 3. Production- Annex to OPORDER or Separate FP Order
- 4. Subordinate units given time for planning
- 5. Rehearsals
- 6. Adjustments and updates to original plan



### Execution

- 1. Monitor and refine plans as required
- 2. Coordination with FP Support units
- 3. Monitoring of potential attackers
- 4. Instructions from headquarters
- 5. AAR and reporting of the outcome of the operation

### Take Away

- Unit operations require DMP focused on FP
- Look at FP from the unit's current location, transit, and the tactical areas of operation
- Never straightforward, requires threat-based approach
- A unit's FP CoAs require the unit to execute tasks to mitigate risks by reducing the impact of the threat or the likelihood of the threat
- Effective FP requires coordination and information sharing
- Peacekeepers need to be proactive and creative within the boundaries existing guidance and principles

### Questions